Friday, May 1, 2026


Reflections on the political book 'Destination Autonomy', by the Leader of the Conservative Party of Quebec (PCQ), Mr. Éric Duhaime, April 2026

By Rodrigue Tremblay, emeritus professor of Economics, Université de Montréal and former minister


"Teachers are teaching nationalism in schools. They tell their their students that Quebec is a state [État], and that's false. Quebec is a province, a township, indistinct."
Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1919-2000), Liberal Prime minister of the Canadian federal government, (remarks made in 1994, as reported by Michel David in Le Devoir, October 29, 2016).

It is not easy to relive history.

In essence, the leader of the Conservative Party of Quebec, Éric Duhaime, is right in adopting a Quebec autonomy platform for his party. (1) 
In so doing, he wants to return to an ad hoc approach in the relations between the government of Quebec and the Canadian federal government. This method has yielded positive results in the past, such as the repatriation of income tax in 1954 and the adoption of the Quebec Pension Plan, separate from the federal tax system in other Canadian provinces, in 1964.

Éric Duhaime is doing what PQ leaders could have done after their two referendum defeats, in 1980 and 1995, if they had conducted a proper analysis of the geopolitical reasons forf their losses. Indeed, these two successive defeats contributed to the loss of significant powers of the Quebec Parliament, powers which were transferred to federal judges appointed and paid by the federal government. Politically, this has sent Quebec back to the pre-1867 era.

Without saying so explicitly, the leader of the PCQ would undoubtedly like the Canadian federal government to redress the enormous wrongs done to Quebec with the passage of the Constitution Act of 1982, adopted without the consent of the Quebec government and without having been approved in a public referendum.

It is true that Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1919-2000), and other politicians in Ottawa, knowingly or unknowingly misled the electorate during the May 20,1980 referendum, by subtly leading Quebecers to believe that a "No" vote was "not a vote for the status quo". In fact, many voters understood that a "No" vote would be a vote in favor of the "No" camp's explanatory Beige Paper, a manifesto entitled "A New Canadian Federation". This manifesto proposed seven constitutional amendments as an alternative to the 'Yes' camp's White Paper, a manifesto entitled "On Equal Terms", which proposed bilateral negotiations to grant Quebec the status of Sovereignty-Association. (2)

The seven constitutional proposals in the Beige Paper were:

̣̣̣̣̣1- Adoption of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the integration of the French and English languages into the Canadian Constitution (in addition to extending it to the provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick).

2- Guarantee of the right of every individual to allow their child to study in English or French "where numbers warrant it".

3- Abolition of the Senate.

4- Creation of a Federal Council composed of delegations from the provinces (with 25% of delegates from Quebec) whose mandate would be to oversee federal government initiatives that could "alter the fundamental balance of the federation". The Council would also establish a joint committee (French-speaking and English-speaking) focusing specifically on language issues.

5- Creation of a dual bench (equal representation of Canada and Quebec) on the Supreme Court for all constitutional cases.

6- Transfer of residual powers to the provinces.

7- Transfer to the provinces of powers over education, subsidies and scholarships, radio and television programming, social reintegration programs, workforce training, and the reception and integration of immigrants.

The Beige Paper was the work of Claude Ryan, leader of the Liberal Party of Quebec (PLQ) and head of the "No" side.

On May 20, 1980, the "No" side garnered 59,56% of the votes cast, partly because its Beige Paper of proposals of federal decentralization was popular.

But PQ leaders said that the population had "said No to itself", which was an anti-democratic interpretation.

Indeed, in the 1980 and 1995 referendums, the only constitutional option on the ballot was the proposition advanced by the government: negotiating sovereignty-association for Quebec (1980) or Quebec independence (1995). In both instances, this was therefore a plebiscite, not a genuine referendum, and not a choice between a few constitutional options.

[Definition of a plebiscite: "A consultation by which a government asks all citizens to express their confidence by voting yes or no on a proposal."]

After the referendum defeats of 1980 and 1995, it might have been possible to demand that the harm done to Quebec by the Constitution Act of 1982 be redressed, because the elected Quebec Parliament was placed under the arbitrary authority of unelected federal judges, named and paid by the federal government, for many of its democratically adopted laws. This was done against its will and against the will of the Quebec population, which was never consulted on such a political regression for Quebec.

The Conservative governments of Brian Mulroney (1939-2024) and Stephen Harper (1959- ) in Ottawa might have been more open to the demands of a more autonomist Quebec government to protect its language and culture.

However, we should't be too optimistic.

Indeed, we shouldn't be too optimistic, because the failure of the Meech Lake Accord on June 23, 1990, and the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the October 26,1992 federal referendum—which was rejected in both Quebec and in the rest of Canadaclearly demonstrated that constitutional changes in Canada are not easy. Indeed, under the terms of the Constitution Act of 1982, a constitutional amendment requires the approval either of unanimity of the federal government and of provincial governments, for a short list of institutional issues, or an approval by the federal government and 2/3 of Canadian provinces for most other amendments. But ad hoc agreements between Quebec and Ottawa are still possible.

As I explain in my 2018 book, "Quebec's Regression, 2980-2018", published by Éditions Fides, for an autonomist approach to have been adopted, the Parti Québécois (PQ) would have had to prioritize the nation over partisanship, and the government would have had to resign after the lost plebiscite of May 20, 1980.This could have stopped the Trudeau government's strategy of going ahead with unilateral constitutional changes to increase federal centralization, without approval by the Quebec government.

Indeed, there was a strong likelihood, then, that Claude Ryan, leader of the Liberal Party of Quebec (PLQ) and the winning leader of the No side in the referendum, could have been elected Premier of Quebec, and he was opposed to federal centralization.

If this had been the case, Pierre Elliott Trudeau could not have claimed that his option of a more centralized Canadian federation had prevailed in the Quebec referendum. The entire narrative would have been altered.

But that didn't happen, essentially because Premier René Levesque (1922-1987) chose not to respect the unequivocal vote of the Quebec electorate and clung to power for another full year.

Prime Minister Trudeau was then able to proceed, without Quebec's consent, with the repatriation of the British North America Act (BNAA 1867) from London, with the assistance of the Supreme Court of Canada, then presided over by Bora Laskin (1912-1984), and the governments of the provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick.

After what became known as the Night of the Long Knives, on November 4-5, 1981, Pierre Elliott Trudeau succeeded in having a Charter of Rights included in what became the Constitutional Act of 1982, after conceding to the insertion of a notwithstanding clause, at the request of the recalcitrant English-speaking provinces.

The Constitution Act of 1982 forcibly removed significant prerogatives and legislative powers from the Quebec Parliament and Quebec government, subjecting them to the judgements of federal courts, particularly in matters of language and culture.

Conclusion

I once wrote that the 1982 constitutional changes— imposed by force upon 
Quebec—made the province of Quebec a de facto domestic colony of English-speaking Canada. That situation is threatening Quebec's long-term survival as the only political entity in North America with a French-speaking majority.

______________________________________________

1. Mario Dumont, Éric Duhaime, Autonomist and Serious , Journal de Montréal, April 18, 2026

2. On June 12, 1978, Pierre Elliott Trudeau introduced Bill C-60 in the House of Commons, along with a white paper entitled "Time to Act", in which he proposed renewing Canadian federalism. He also proposed the adoption of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the replacement of the Senate with a House of the Federation, and the redefinition of the roles of the Governor General, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet.

See, Claude-V. Marsolais, The Confiscated Referendum, Montréal, VLB Éditeur, 1992,

_____________________________________________________________


International economist Dr. Rodrigue Tremblay is the author of the book about morals "The code for Global Ethics, Ten Humanist Principles" of the book about geopolitics "The New American Empire", and of his recent book, in French, "La régression tranquille du Québec, 1980-2018". 

He holds a Ph.D. in international finance from Stanford University.

Please visit Dr. Tremblay's site or email to a friend here.

Posted Friday, May 1, 2026.

*** To receive new postings of Dr. Tremblay's articles, 
please send Subscribe to jcarole261@gmail.com

To unsubscribe, please send Unsubscribe to jcarole261@gmail.com

To contact the author, please send to this address: rodrigue.tremblay1@gmail.com
______________________________________________________________

© 2026 Dr. Rodrigue Tremblay